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VaultKit’s guarantees come from combining typed calldata, signed intents, operator quorum, onchain Shield validation, and a timelocked owner bypass.

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1. Typed Calldata Only

Curators should use typed vendor overlays such as shield.morpho.reallocate(vault, allocations, options?). The overlay builds calldata through the vendor’s own SDK. shield.sendCall(...) remains an escape hatch for unwrapped vendors; when using it, the curator owns calldata integrity.

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2. Exact-Tx Attestation Binding

The attestation binds to the full Intent: signer, target, value, calldata, chain, and function signature. A curator cannot swap calldata after approval, and an attacker cannot reuse an approval for a different vault action.

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3. Onchain Policy Parameters

Policy params live onchain in NewtonPolicy.PolicyConfig.policyParams. For composite packs, those bytes are a manifest envelope with _manifest, modules, and params; depositors can decode it and compare the modules against getPolicyData() and each oracle’s getWasmCid().

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4. Manager Actions Only

The Shield holds vendor manager roles, such as a MetaMorpho allocator or curator role. End-user deposits and withdrawals do not route through Shield. Vendor-side role grants determine which forwarded manager actions can succeed.

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5. Fail Closed; Bypass Via Timelock

If the gateway is unavailable, operators do not reach quorum, policy evaluation denies, delegate validation fails, or onchain attestation validation fails, Shield does not forward the vault call. The only emergency escape is the owner-queued bypass path, which waits at least the configured delay before execution and emits observable events.

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Supporting Checks

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Non-Upgradeable Clones

Shield clones are EIP-1167 minimal proxies to a fixed implementation. There is no proxy-admin upgrade path. A new implementation requires a new factory and curator opt-in through a new clone.